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May 6, 2014

Gold fix lawsuits will mean more to gold's price than Ukraine, Hathaway says: GATA | THE GATA DISPATCH -May 06, 2014-.

Gold fix lawsuits will mean more to gold's price than Ukraine, Hathaway says

Submitted by cpowell on 03:00PM ET Tuesday, May 6, 2014. Section: Daily Dispatches
6p ET Tuesday, May 6, 2014
Gold's long-term outlook is less likely to be influenced by the conflict over Ukraine, Tocqueville Gold Fund manager John Hathaway tells King World News today, than by the light shed on the relationship between real gold and paper gold by lawsuits against the bullion banks participating in the daily London gold fix:
CHRIS POWELL, Secretary/Treasurer
Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee Inc.

Einhorn finds dinner chat with Bernanke 'frightening': GATA | THE GATA DISPATCH -May 06, 2014-.

Einhorn finds dinner chat with Bernanke 'frightening'

Submitted by cpowell on 03:35PM ET Tuesday, May 6, 2014. Section: Daily Dispatches
By Katherine Burton
Bloomberg News
Tuesday, May 6, 2014
David Einhorn, manager of the $10 billion Greenlight Capital Inc., said he found a recent dinner conversation with former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke scary.
"I got to ask him all these questions that had been on my mind for a long time," Einhorn said in an interview today with Erik Schatzker and Stephanie Ruhle on Bloomberg Television, referring to a March 26 dinner with Bernanke. "It was sort of frightening because the answers were not better than I thought they would be."
Einhorn, 45, has been critical of Bernanke's willingness to leave interest rates near zero for more than five years. The hedge-fund manager has said the benefits of low rates diminish over time until they are more harmful than helpful and that the Fed's stimulus has led to income inequality. Bernanke, a former Princeton University economics professor, stepped down this year after eight years helming the U.S. central bank. ...
... For the complete story:

FTC | Enforcement Actions - May 06, 2014: FTC Approves Final Consent Orders in Deceptive Auto Dealers’ Ads Cases

Following public comment periods, the Federal Trade Commission approved final consent orders involving 10 auto dealers’ deceptive advertising charges.
Under the settlement orders, the dealerships are prohibited from misrepresenting in any advertisement for the purchase, financing, or leasing of motor vehicles the cost of leasing a vehicle, the cost of purchasing a vehicle with financing, or any other material fact about the price, sale, financing, or leasing of a vehicle. When relevant, consent orders also address the alleged Truth in Lending Act and Consumer Leasing Act violations by requiring the dealerships to clearly and conspicuously disclose terms required by these credit and lease laws. In the case where the dealership misrepresented that consumers had won a prize, the consent order also prohibits misrepresenting material terms of any prize, sweepstakes, giveaway, or other incentive.
The ten dealerships are:
The cases were part of Operation Steer Clear, a nationwide sweep focusing on misleading advertising associated with the selling, financing, and leasing of motor vehicles. Auto-related complaints remain one of the top 10 complaints to the Commission, and the sweep was part of the agency’s ongoing efforts toprotect consumers in the auto marketplace.
The Federal Trade Commission works for consumers to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices and to provide information to help spot, stop, and avoid them. To file a complaint in English or Spanish, visit the FTC’s online Complaint Assistant or call 1-877-FTC-HELP (1-877-382-4357). The FTC enters complaints into Consumer Sentinel, a secure, online database available to more than 2,000 civil and criminal law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad. The FTC’s website providesfree information on a variety of consumer topics. Like the FTC on Facebook, follow us on Twitter, andsubscribe to press releases for the latest FTC news and resources.
Cheryl Warner
Office of Public Affairs 
Mark Glassman
Bureau of Consumer Protection 

Carole Reynolds
Bureau of Consumer Protection

John Jacobs
FTC’s Western Regional Office – Los Angeles

Christina Tusan
FTC’s Western Regional Office – Los Angeles 
More news from the FTC >>

FTC | Consumers Update - May 06, 2014: FTC’s Complaint Assistant: we’re going mobile.

Federal Trade Commission Consumer Information

by Bridget Small
Consumer Education Specialist, FTC
If a business doesn’t deliver on its promises or someone cheats you out of your money, the Federal Trade Commission wants to hear about it. Our new Mobile Complaint Assistant at makes it possible to file a complaint using your smartphone or tablet.
Read more >

FRB | Press Release - May 6, 2014: Federal Reserve Board announces termination of enforcement actions

Press Release

Release Date: May 6, 2014

For immediate release

The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday announced the termination of the enforcement actions listed below:
Continental Bank Holdings, Inc., Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania
Cease and Desist Order issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision dated February 28, 2011
Terminated May 3, 2014
First National Bancshares of Central Alabama, Inc., Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Written Agreement dated June 23, 2011
Terminated May 2, 2014
HMN Financial, Inc., Rochester, Minnesota
Supervisory Agreement issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision dated February 22, 2011
Terminated May 1, 2014
Lincoln Federal Bancorp, M.H.C. and Lincoln Federal Bancorp, Inc., both of Lincoln, Nebraska
Cease and Desist Orders issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision dated October 6, 2009
Terminated May 2, 2014
Search of Federal Reserve enforcement actions.
For media inquiries, call 202-452-2955.

Last update: May 6, 2014

Gerald Celente | Trends in The News - May 06, 2014: Gerald Celente - Trends In The News - "More Peace, Less Brut

Gerald Celente - Trends In The News - "More Peace, Less Brut

YouTube | Al Jazeera English has uploaded News Bulletin - 20:35 GMT update | Afghan gunfire disperses aid workers helping landslide victims | France fights to save engineering giant.

Al Jazeera English has uploaded News Bulletin - 20:35 GMT update
News Bulletin - 20:35 GMT update
Al Jazeera English
The main headlines on Al Jazeera English, featuring the latest news and reports from around the world.

Afghan gunfire disperses aid workers helping landslide victims
Afghan gunfire disperses aid workers helping landslide victims
Al Jazeera English
There's been violence at an aid camp in Afghanistan where survivors of Friday's landslide are sheltering. Gunshots were fired into the air when crowds of villagers started fighting with police over supplies. 250 people have been confirmed dead from the landslide - and thousands have been left homeless. Al Jazeera's Imtiaz Tyab reports from Ab Bareek.
France fights to save engineering giant
France fights to save engineering giant
Al Jazeera English
The French government is fighting to save one of its biggest engineering firms, Alstom, from going under. Two foreign companies are vying for a takeover, which has many worred about the future of jobs in the region where Alstom is based. Catherine Stancl has more.

YouTube | VOAvideo has uploaded Bringing Healing to Traumatized Victims of Mass Violence | American Physicians Hit Soccer Field to Promote Health | Young Women Work to Break into Senegalese Hip-Hop

VOAvideo has uploaded Bringing Healing to Traumatized Victims of Mass Violence
Bringing Healing to Traumatized Victims of Mass Violence
An estimated one billion people around the world have experienced mass violence, torture or terrorism and are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety. Some are unable to work or care for themselves or their families. Now, a small American foundation, begun by the family of a victim of the September 11 attacks, is establishing trauma clinics in poor countries scarred by violence. VOA News's Carolyn Weaver reports.

American Physicians Hit Soccer Field to Promote Health
American Physicians Hit Soccer Field to Promote Health
Everyone knows exercising is important to stay healthy, but not everyone is doing it regularly. A group of American physicians says it wants to lead by example. They formed a soccer team which will represent the U.S.A. in an annual international soccer tournament. The group has also developed an outreach program to inspire children to get fit. VOA's June Soh met the U.S. Medical Soccer Team during its visit to the nation's capital.

 Young Women Work to Break into Senegalese Hip-Hop
Young Women Work to Break into Senegalese Hip-Hop
Hip-hop may still be a man's world in Senegal, but more women are breaking into the so-called "urban arts." VOA's Anne Look reports from Dakar on how a local NGO is holding workshops to mentor, train and try to help the country's next generation of female hip-hop artists.

FRB | Speeches - May 06, 2014:Speech by Governor Stein on challenges for monetary policy communication


Governor Jeremy C. Stein

At the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York

May 6, 2014

Challenges for Monetary Policy Communication

The Money Marketeers have a long tradition of hosting policymakers and fostering informed public discussion, and I am delighted to join in this tradition.1 
Last month I announced that I would be leaving the Federal Reserve Board at the end of May in order to return to my teaching position at Harvard. So I would like to take a moment to express my gratitude to my many colleagues at the Board and around the Federal Reserve System who have taught me so much--not just about economic policy, but about public service. It has been a privilege to work alongside such a talented and selfless group of people and to be a part of such a special institution.
One of the many aspects of the job that I had not fully appreciated before joining the Board is how challenging the whole process of communicating about monetary policy can be. As you know, over the past several years the Federal Reserve has dramatically altered how it talks to financial markets and to the public at large. For much of its 100-year history, the Fed was remarkably opaque; indeed, around the time I started my academic career in the mid-1980s, there was an active literature on the causes and consequences of such opacity. The title of Marvin Goodfriend's 1986 paper captured the situation well: "Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking."2 In the 1990s, however, the Fed began to move toward greater transparency, with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) providing more timely information about its policy decisions.
This evolution in the direction of greater openness has continued. And, in the last 10 years, there have been numerous changes in the FOMC's communications policies: accelerated release of the minutes, an increase in the frequency and scope of participants' economic projections, and the introduction of postmeeting news conferences, to name a few.
These are all welcome developments, and I expect there will be further changes down the road, as the Committee keeps trying to improve how it explains its policy decisions to the public. In this spirit, I would like to spend the rest of my time discussing a few of the things that make life interesting for those trying to communicate clearly and effectively about monetary policy.
More specifically, I am going to touch on three factors that strike me as particularly relevant for our efforts in this area: the fact that the market is not a single person, the fact that the Committee is not a single person either, and the delicate interplay between the Committee and the market.
The Market Is Not a Single Person
This point was very nicely made by Hyun Shin in his remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's symposium at Jackson Hole last summer. Shin wrote:
The "market" is not a person. Market prices are outcomes of the interaction of many actors, and not the beliefs of any one actor....But most discussions of central bank forward guidance treat the market as if it were an individual that you can sit down and reason with....By doing so, I believe we are in danger of committing a category mistake where we anthropomorphize the "market" as a rational individual with beliefs.3 
Let me give you a particular example that illustrates the wisdom of Shin's observation. In early May 2013, long-term Treasury yields were in the neighborhood of 1.60 percent. Two months later, shortly after our June 2013 FOMC meeting, they were around 2.70 percent. Clearly, a significant chunk of the move came in response to comments made during this interval by Chairman Bernanke about the future of our asset purchase program. For example, in his June 19 press conference, he said:
If the incoming data are broadly consistent with this forecast, the Committee currently anticipates that it would be appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of purchases later this year. And if the subsequent data remain broadly aligned with our current expectations for the economy, we would continue to reduce the pace of purchases in measured steps through the first half of next year, ending purchases around midyear.4 
Perhaps it is not surprising that news about the future course of the asset purchase program would have a strong effect on markets. But here is the striking fact: According to the Survey of Primary Dealers conducted by the New York Fed, there was hardly any change over this period in the expectation of the median respondent as to the ultimate size of the program.5 Chairman Bernanke's comments may have clarified the FOMC's intentions, but, according to the survey, they did not have any clear directional implications for the total amount of accommodation to be provided via asset purchases. Thus, FOMC communications in this period did not appear to be meaningfully hawkish.
So what gives? One hypothesis is that going into the May-June period, there was a wide divergence of opinion among market participants as to the future of the asset purchase program. In particular, however reasonable the median expectation, there were a number of "QE-infinity" optimists who expected our purchases to go on for a very long time. And, crucially, in asset markets, it is often the beliefs of the most optimistic investors--rather than those of the moderates--that drive prices, as they are the ones most willing to take large positions based on their beliefs. Moreover, this same optimism can motivate them to leverage their positions aggressively.6 
In this setting, a piece of monetary policy communication that merely "clarifies" things--that is, one that delivers the median market expectation but truncates some of the more extreme possibilities--can have powerful effects. Highly levered optimists are forced to unwind their positions, which then must be absorbed by other investors with lower valuations. This effect is likely to be amplified if the preannouncement period was one with unusually low volatility, as was the case in early May 2013, when the implied volatility on long-tenor swaptions was near historical lows. To the extent that some of the optimists are operating subject to value-at-risk constraints, low volatility is likely to induce them to take on more leverage. If volatility rises sharply in the wake of an announcement, this increase will tend to exacerbate the unwind effect.
To be clear, I am not saying that monetary policy communications should have been different during this period. Rather, the point is that in some circumstances there are very real limits to what even the most careful and deliberate communications strategy can do to temper market volatility. This is just the nature of the beast when dealing with speculative markets, and to suggest otherwise--to suggest that, say, "good communication" alone can engineer a completely smooth exit from a period of extraordinary policy accommodation--is to create an unrealistic expectation.
In this spirit, I think the FOMC may face a similar communications challenge as the nature of the forward guidance for the path of short-term interest rates evolves over the next couple of years. The 6.5 percent unemployment threshold that we had until recently was not only quantitative in nature, but it also represented a relatively firm commitment on the part of the Committee. While this kind of commitment was entirely appropriate at the zero lower bound, as policy eventually normalizes, guidance will necessarily take a different form; it will be both more qualitative as well as less deterministic. So, for example, when I fill in my "dot" for 2016 in the Survey of Economic Projections, I think of myself as writing down not a commitment for where the federal funds rate will be at that time, but only my best forecast, and one that is highly uncertain at that.
Chair Yellen made a similar point in her March press conference:
More generally, you know, the end of 2016 is a long way out. Monetary policy will be geared to evolving conditions in the economy, and the public does need to understand that as those views evolve, the Committee's views on policy will likely evolve with them. And that's a kind of uncertainty that the Committee wouldn't want to eliminate completely from its guidance because we want the policy we put in place to be appropriate to the economic conditions that will prevail years down the road.7 
I agree completely with this view, and I suspect that many in the market also understand the distinction that is being drawn--that as policy normalizes, forward guidance will be less commitment-like and, hence, a less precise guide to our future actions than it has been in the recent past. But I would not want to presume that everybody is thinking about it the same way; one can imagine that there might again be some optimists who are in this case underestimating the degree of uncertainty about the future path of policy and are placing levered bets accordingly. So we may have some further bumps in the road as this all plays out.
The Committee Is Not a Single Person
It is common to hear observers talk about the Committee's reaction function, which describes how we will behave in various contingencies. However, even if all of the individual members of the Committee have well-defined and carefully thought-out individual reaction functions--that is, each member knows what his or her policy preference is for any given state of the world--it does not follow that the Committee as a whole has an equally well-defined reaction function.
The reason for this divergence is that when one says that the Committee has a reaction function for how it will behave if contingency X arises, such a statement implies that we have fully litigated this contingency in advance. In other words, we have debated the pros and cons, we have hashed out our differences, and we have come to an agreement on how to proceed under contingency X. But such litigation is difficult and sometimes costly, as it may, for example, take considerable time or lead to a loss of cohesion on other, more pressing issues. So it may be easier and more efficient to leave our behavior in some important contingencies for future discussions. Think of why people often forgo prenuptial agreements when getting married--it is simply too painful to negotiate over every contingency ahead of time.
This observation is helpful in understanding some of the differences between an open-ended asset purchase program, such as QE3, and its closed-end predecessors. One advantage of going with an open-ended approach is that when we rolled out QE3 in September 2012, we were able to make a forceful statement that we would continue with asset purchases until we observed, as Chairman Bernanke put it in his postmeeting press conference, a "substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market."8 We were able to do so even though I suspect that, had we tried to put a number to it, there would have been considerable disagreement among Committee members as to the exact meaning of "substantial improvement." So in this case, leaving the Committee's reaction function incompletely worked out allowed us to move forward with a major policy initiative in a timely manner, which otherwise might have been very difficult.
Of course, the flip side of this reaction-function incompleteness is that it becomes harder for the Committee to precisely communicate its future intentions to the market--in part because these future intentions have not yet been fully fleshed out. Rather, it makes more sense in this case to think of the Committee's reaction function as being something that is not entirely predetermined and that will naturally tend to evolve over time.
The Interaction of the Committee and the Market
Going further, it is important to note that this evolution of the reaction function does not happen in a vacuum, where the Committee deliberates in a cloistered fashion and then simply reports its decisions to the market. All along, the market is making conjectures about how we will behave, and these conjectures in turn can have a powerful influence on the debate itself. This feedback effect has been especially relevant in the case of QE3, because the policy has relied significantly on a signaling channel for some of its effectiveness. That is, QE3 has, in my view, mattered not just because of the direct downward pressure on longer-term interest rates associated with removing a given quantity of duration from the private market, but also because it has buttressed our forward guidance by serving as a credible signal of the Committee's intentions with respect to the future path of the federal funds rate.
Of course, if the Committee is using asset purchases to signal its policy intentions, then the information content of purchase decisions depends importantly on what the publicexpects it to do. For example, if it is early 2013 and the market has somehow arrived at the belief that the Committee will continue buying assets at an $85 billion per month clip so long as monthly payroll growth does not exceed 200,000 jobs per month for three months in a row, then even a small cut down to $80 billion per month is likely to elicit a powerful market reaction--not because the $5 billion cut is consequential in and of itself, but because of the message it sends about the Committee's policy leanings more generally. But then you can see the feedback loop that arises: The more strongly the market becomes attached to this belief--even if it was initially somewhat arbitrary--the more wary the Committee must be of making an unexpected change, and this wariness further reinforces the market's initial belief. In this sense, the Committee's reaction function for the appropriate quantity of asset purchases under the QE3 program is not only evolving over time, it is coevolving along with the market's beliefs.
In part for this reason, I believe we are currently in a very good position with respect to the market's expectations for our asset purchases going forward. Market participants now appear to almost uniformly expect that, barring a material change in the outlook for the economy, the Committee is likely to continue tapering our purchases in further measured steps over the remainder of this year. With these expectations in place, the execution of the taper itself becomes much easier, as we no longer have to worry about a step-down at each meeting sending a potentially misleading message about our intentions with respect to the future path of the federal funds rate.9 
The case of QE3 illustrates the point that the Committee's reaction function is shaped by market expectations and vice versa. But I suspect that the point has more general applicability. Consider the well-known phenomenon of "gradualism" in monetary policy, whereby changes to the policy rate during an easing or tightening cycle tend to come in a series of small and relatively predictable steps. This phenomenon is reflected in the fact that the Committee's behavior in normal times can be approximately described by an "inertial" version of a Taylor rule--one in which, in addition to putting weight on inflation and unemployment, the Committee also behaves as if it has an aversion to making sudden large changes in the federal funds rate.
However, such a reduced-form description of the Committee's behavior does not answer the question of why this kind of inertia might be optimal. Why should the Committee act as if it is averse to making sharp changes in the funds rate? At one level, the answer is clear: This behavior is in the service of our mandate, and nothing more. For if we were to make an unexpectedly abrupt adjustment at any time, it would likely have a large effect on long-term rates and credit conditions more generally, which in turn might compromise our ability to reach our goals for employment and inflation--for example, a large bond-market move of this sort might nip a nascent recovery in the bud, which is why it is to be avoided.
Digging deeper, though, it is important to recognize that part of the reason that the bond market would react so strongly to a sharp change in the short-term policy rate is that we have settled into a self-sustaining equilibrium in which the Fed tends to act gradually, and the market has come to expect that gradualism. In other words, the market has learned that a given increase in the federal funds rate at the beginning of a tightening cycle is typically followed by many more moves in the same direction, so there is naturally a multiplier effect on long-term rates of a given change in short-term rates. And that multiplier depends on the expected degree of gradualism: The more inertia there is in Fed policy, the more significant is any small move, and hence the larger is the multiplier. Thus, an expectation of gradualism on the part of the market makes it all the more important for the Fed to adjust the policy rate gradually, thereby fulfilling the market's beliefs.
This line of reasoning can be thought of as a piece of positive economics--that is, it may shed some light on why the world is as it is. But what, if any, are its normative implications? On the one hand, as I have emphasized, a gradualist approach to monetary policy is likely to be the best way for us to deliver on our mandate at any point in time, taking as given the market's expectations for Fed behavior. As such, it would probably not make sense, in the short run, for the Committee to deviate from this approach--with an unprepared market, the result might well be an undesirable degree of market turbulence, with attendant negative effects on the real economy.
On the other hand, there is clearly a time-consistency problem lurking here; the world we are in need not be the best of all possible worlds. In particular, it is interesting to think about an alternative long-run equilibrium in which the Fed has somehow developed a reputation for worrying less about the immediate bond-market effect of its actions and is known to react more aggressively to changes in economic conditions.10 In this alternative equilibrium, the market would expect the Fed to behave in a less gradualist fashion, so any given move in the funds rate would have a smaller multiplier effect on long rates. Thus, it is possible that in this alternative world, market volatility would be no higher than it is in our world, but the Fed would nevertheless be able to adjust policy more nimbly when it needed to.
Of course, even if this alternative world is a better place, it may be difficult as an institutional matter to get from here to there. And I do not have any particularly helpful insights on how one would make the transition. Nevertheless, I do think there is a useful message to be borne in mind when thinking about communications strategy more generally. There is always a temptation for the central bank to speak in a whisper, because anything that gets said reverberates so loudly in markets. But the softer it talks, the more the market leans in to hear better and, thus, the more the whisper gets amplified. So efforts to overly manage the market volatility associated with our communications may ultimately be self-defeating. As we evaluate our own performance in the communications department, it is probably better for us to focus on how legitimately transparent we have succeeded in being, as opposed to how much or how little our various announcements have moved markets.

1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily shared by other members of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. I am grateful to William English for helpful comments. Return to text
2. See Marvin Goodfriend (1986), "Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking," Leaving the BoardJournal of Monetary Economics, vol. 17 (January), pp. 63-92. Return to text
3. See Hyun Song Shin (2013), "Commentary on Robert E. Hall, 'The Routes into and out of the Zero Lower Bound,'" speech delivered at "Global Dimensions of Unconventional Monetary Policy," Leaving the Board a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, held in Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 22-24, pp. 8-9. Return to text
4. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013), "Transcript of Chairman Bernanke's Press Conference (PDF)," June 19, p. 5. Return to text
5. For example, between the April and July 2013 dealer surveys, the respondents' distributions of the size of the System Open Market Account portfolio at the end of 2014 actually increased somewhat. See the responses to question 10 on the April survey and question 8 on the July survey; the survey results are available on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's websiteLeaving the Board  Return to text
6. See John Geanakoplos (2009), "The Leverage Cycle," Leaving the Board in Daron Acemoglu, Kenneth Rogoff, and Michael Woodford, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 1-65. Return to text
7. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2014), "Transcript of Chair Yellen's Press Conference (PDF)," March 19, pp. 9-10. Return to text
8. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), "Transcript of Chairman Bernanke's Press Conference (PDF)," September 13, p. 3. Return to text
9. However, any deviation from the pattern of measured steps that the Committee has been taking would now likely be seen as a highly informative signal, which is something that the Committee would need to take into account in responding to changes in the outlook. Return to text
10. There is a close connection between this time-consistency problem and the well-known one that central banks face in trading off inflation and unemployment. With respect to the latter, Kenneth Rogoff has argued that one can achieve a better outcome with a "conservative" central banker who places a higher weight on controlling inflation than does society as a whole. In the current context, the analogy would be that one may be able to achieve a better outcome with a central banker who places a lower weight on the intermediate objective of not roiling the bond market. See Kenneth Rogoff (1985), "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," Leaving the Board Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 100 (November), pp. 1169-89. Return to text

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Last update: May 6, 2014

DealBook P.M. Edition - May 06, 2014: Top Story:AstraZeneca Makes Case Against Pfizer's Bid.

For the latest updates, go to »
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2014
AstraZeneca is a British drug maker.
AstraZeneca Makes Case Against Pfizer's Bid In presenting long-term financial estimates, AstraZeneca said it expected to achieve annual revenue of $45 billion by 2023, suggesting Pfizer's bid undervalued the company.
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Marijn E. Dekkers told Andrew Ross Sorkin that the German drug maker agreed to acquire Merck's consumer care business for $14.2 billion.
Bayer Buys Merck's Consumer Business for $14.2 Billion The deal will make the German drug maker one of the largest providers of over-the-counter products and give it such well-known brands as Claritin, Coppertone and Dr. Scholl's.
Arnaud Montebourg, the French economy minister, laid out a number of conditions that G.E. would have to meet in its bid for Alstom's  power generation and transmission business.
French Government Becomes Broker in Alstom BidFrench leaders said they were not closing the door on the G.E. bid for much of Alstom, but said that they would approve only if the deal could be completed in a way that protected French workers and the French industrial base.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner walking with President Obama to the Oval Office in December 2012. Mr. Geithner left the post a little more than a month later.
Another View: What Tim Geithner Got Right Jennifer Taub, an associate professor at Vermont Law School, considers the former Treasury secretary's legacy, as his book, "Stress Test," is about to come out.
The headquarters of Morgan Stanley in New York.
Morgan Stanley Fined $5 Million Over I.P.O. WorkThe Financial Industry Regulatory Authority said Morgan Stanley did not follow proper procedures in the initial public offerings for 83 companies, including those of Facebook and Yelp.
Fund Founded by Alistair Lumsden Opens to Outside MoneyEast Lodge Capital Partners, a London hedge fund founded by Alistair Lumsden, is seeking to raise $250 million in assets under management in its first three months of trading.
The headquarters of Barclays in London.
Barclays Technology Banker to Join Evercore J. Stuart Francis, who has been chairman of the global technology group at Barclays since 2008, will join Evercore Partners in August.
A security guard exits a branch of Barclays in London.
A List of Those Who've Left Barclays This Year With the exit of J. Stuart Francis, Barclays has lost yet another top banker. DealBook tallies the departed.
A branch of Barclays in London.
Earnings Slide at Barclays on Trading Slowdown The British bank Barclays said it was confident that the recent departures of several top bankers in New York would not damage its franchise.
UBS headquarters in Zurich.
UBS Profit Rises 7% Amid Restructuring The giant Swiss bank UBS also said it planned an overhaul of its legal structure, adding that it would make a special payment to shareholders.
KPMG Buys Restructuring Advisory Firm The accounting giant KPMG has acquired the turnaround consulting firm BBK. Terms of the deal were not disclosed.
Yellen Heads to Congress to Lay Out Fed's Forecast The economy nearly shrank in the first quarter, then bounced back quickly, to judge by the April jobs report. On Wednesday morning, the Federal Reserve chairwoman, Janet L. Yellen, heads to Capitol Hill to tell the Joint Economic Committee what the Fed is forecasting for the rest of the year. On Thursday morning, she will repeat the performance before the Senate Budget Committee.
European Central Bank to Meet on Monetary Policy The European Central Bank meets on Thursday in Brussels. Even though inflation is well below the bank's target of about 2 percent, most analysts expect the governing council to wait at least another month before taking further action to stimulate the euro zone economy.
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